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Proposition Four: Preventive
Detention v. Pretrial Liberty
On June 8, 1982 Article I Sec. 12 of the California Constitution
which had made pretrial bail mandatory in the case of a felony was
amended1 by Proposition 42. Proposition 4 now provides for pretrial
preventive detention3 through the denial of bail. Traditionally, the sole
purpose of bail4 has been to assure the defendant's appearance and
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.' Furthermore when there is
no fear of flight the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment has been interpreted to require states to release indigents on their
own recognizance.6 Bail has always been discretionary on both the
federal and state levels when the accused is charged with a capital of-
fense7 and proof of guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great.8
The reason for this discretion is that when loss of life is threatened as
1. CAL. CONST. art. I, §12.
2. Proposition 4 which amends article 1 section 12 of the California Constitution reads as
follows:
Sec. 12. A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for
(a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great;
(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person when the facts are
evident or the presumption great and the court finds based upon clear and convincing
evidence that there is a substantial likelihood the person's release would result in great
bodily harm to others; or
(c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court
finds based on clear and convincing evidence that the person has threatened another
with great bodily harm and there is a substantial likelihood that the person would carry
out the threat if released.
Excessive bail may not be required. In fixing the amount of bail, the court shall take
into consideration the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of
the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the
case.
A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's discretion.
3. Preventive detention is the incarceration, before trial or pending appeal, of a defendant
thought likely to pose a danger to the community if released. See Comment, The Eighth Amend-ment and the Right to Bail- Historical Perspectives, 82 COLJM. L. REy. 328, 328 n.1 (1982); see
also, Hruska, Preventive Detentioir The Constitution and the Congress, 3 CREIGHTON L. Rv. 36
(1969).
4. Bail is the practice whereby an accused posts a money bond in order to gain pretrial
liberty. If the accused fails to appear for a court date, his or her bond is forfeited and an arrest
warrant is issued. See D. FREED & P. WALD, BAiL IN THE UNiTED STATES 1964, at 1-8 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as FREED].
5. Reynolds v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 30, 32 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1960); Bandy v.
United States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1960).
6. In Re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 103-04; 473 P.2d 999, 1000; 89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 256 (1970).
See Comment, Pretrial Release in Caifforni" Proposed Reforms of an Unfair System, 8 PAC. L.J.
841, 848 (1977).
7. BLACKS LAW DICTIoNARY 189 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
8. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 296, 297-98; see Note, Public Safety Exception to
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punishment for a capital offense, sacrifice of a money bond is not con-
sidered sufficient incentive for appearance. 9 In addition to capital of-
fenses, Proposition 410 now allows the state to deny bail when certain
felony offenses are charged. First, bail may be denied in all felony
cases involving acts of violence against another person when (1) proof
of guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great, and (2) based on
clear and convincing evidence there is a substantial likelihood that the
release of the accused would result in great bodily harm to others. Sec-
ondly, bail may be denied in nonviolent felony cases, where there is
clear and convincing evidence that the accused has threatened another
with great bodily harm, and a substantial likelihood exists that the
threat will be carried out if the accused is released. The first provision
is designed to protect the public at large from a potentially dangerous
individual awaiting trial. The second provision seeks to prevent wit-
ness and victim intimidation.
This comment will begin with a discussion of the traditional right to
pretrial bail as it existed in this country. An argument will then be
made that the existence of the right is inherent in our concept of or-
dered liberty and may not be deprived by the states or federal govern-
ment without due process of law. Circuit court decisions expressly
incorporating the eighth amendment bail clause into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, will be presented to support the
argument that the United States Supreme Court acknowledges pretrial
bail as a fundamental right. As a result of these developments a propo-
sal will be made that pretrial bail may, and as a matter of necessity
should, only be deprived when there is a compelling state interest and
no less restrictive alternatives available to further the interest. Preven-
tive detention in the District of Columbia will be analyzed in an effort
to show the reader that a scheme of preventive detention can exist that
respects the fundamental nature of pretrial liberty. Based upon these
observations, Proposition 4 will be analyzed in light of perceived con-
stitutional conflicts, the most prominent of which is the failure to re-
quire a written statement of reasons to accompany an order of
detention. Finally, a legislative scheme will be proposed balancing a
state's interest in preventive detention against an individual's tradi-
tional and arguably fundamental right to bail.
Right to Bail, 62 CAL. L. REv. 561, 563 (1974); see also 18 U.S.C. §3148 (1970); United States v.
Erwing, D. C. Cal. 1968, 280 F. Supp. 814 (1968).
9. See Note, supra note 8.
10. CAL. CONST. art. I, §12.
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TRADITIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL
4. Eighth Amendment
In 1791 Congress proposed, and the several states ratified the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution.11 The eighth amend-
ment provides that, "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' 12 Ambi-
guity in the wording of the bail clause has left it susceptible to conflict-
ing interpretations. 13 Read literally, the amendment does not expressly
provide for the denial of bail. Therefore, the amendment could have
been interpreted to mean that bail was available in all cases with the
qualification it never be excessive." Such an absolute right to bail has,
however, never been unequivocally accepted." Rather, a majority of
the courts have traditionally interpreted the clause to mean bail shall
not be excessive in those cases where it is a matter of right by statute or
case law, and refusal of bail in those cases when it is not a matter of
right is not excessive.16 Once it is determined by a court that bail is
required by either statute or case law, the focus shifts to setting the
actual amount of bail.
Determination of whether bail is excessive depends entirely upon the
factors the court takes into consideration when setting the amount of
bail. The mechanism of bail balances the defendant's interest in pre-
trial liberty against the interest the court has in assuring the defendant's
attendance at trial.17 A defendant's presence and submission to the
judgment of the court is assured by the threatened forfeiture of the
money bond. As a result, bail has traditionally been considered exces-
sive if it is set at an amount higher than that necessary to assure de-
fendant's appearance at trial. 8 It follows that if no money bond would
secure defendant's appearance at trial, bail could be completely de-
nied.' 9 This denial of bail most frequently occurs when an individual
is charged with a capital offense. 20 In this instance it is often reason-
able to assume that no amount of money will secure the defendant's
appearance because the defendant is faced with the possibility of a
11. The eighth amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
12. Id.
13. See Mitchell, Bail Refoim and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA. L. RE.
1223, 1224 (1969).
14. Id.
15. See Comment, supra note 3, at 328 n.5. ("Clearly, the right to bail is not universal.").
16. Id.
17. See Reynolds v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 30,32 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1959); Comment,
supra note 3, at 331.
18. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
19. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
20. Comment, supra note 3, at 331 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 297).
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death sentence.21
The argument has been made that community safety is always an
underlying consideration when setting the amount of bail.22 Since case
law firmly holds that any amount of bail above the amount designed to
assure defendant's appearance at trial is excessive,23 community safety
should only be a factor in the decision whether to grant or deny bail.
As noted earlier, this comment will present the argument that the right
to be released on bail prior to a showing of guilt is a fundamental right
only to be denied when there is a compelling state interest.24 Even so, a
fundamental right to bail merely indicates the weight that will be ac-
corded a pretrial liberty interest.25 Therefore, in order to support the
theory that a fundamental right to bail has evolved, the next section
will present authority for the proposition that there exists a liberty in-
terest in pretrial freedom that may not be deprived without due process
of law. Once the argument has been made that one accused of a crime
has a due process liberty interest prior to a showing of guilt, this com-
ment will provide authority for the proposition that the pretrial liberty
interest has evolved into a fundamental right not to be denied in the
absence of a compelling state interest.
B. Pretrial Liberty and Due Process
Two United States Supreme Court cases, decided during the October
Term of 1951, addressed the issue of the fundamental nature of pretrial
bail and the circumstances under which it could be denied. In Stack v.
Boyle,6 the Supreme Court noted that since the passage of the Judici-
ary Act of 178927 federal law had "unequivocally provided that a per-
son arrested for a noncapital offense shall be admitted to bail. '2 8 The
Supreme Court then characterized pretrial liberty as a traditional right
21. Id.
22. Kennedy, 4New Approach to BailRelease: The Proposed Federal Criminal Code and Bail
Reform, 48 FoRDHsAm L. REv. 423, 428, n.40 (1980); Hruska, supra note 3, at 38-39.
23. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
24. See notes 91-106 and accompanying text infra.
25. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376
(1978) [hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
The [Supreme] Court [has]... adopted a theory of selective incorporation. Under this
concept only those provisions of the Bill of Rights that the Court considers fundamental
to the American System of law are applied to the states through the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
If a right is determined by the Supreme Court to be fundamental, the right can only be denied
when there is a compelling state interest. See NOWAY, supra, at 524. "Under the due process
guarantee, the Court will employ this level of strict scrutiny only in reviewing legislation which
limits fundamental constitutional rights." Id.
26. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
27. 1 STAT. 73, 91.
28. 342 U.S. at 4.
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which allowed the unhampered preparation of a defense and prevented
the infliction of punishment prior to a showing of guilt.29 To under-
score this conviction, the Supreme Court emphasized that unless the
right to pretrial liberty was preserved by release on bail, "the presump-
tion of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle would lose its
meaning." 30 Although largely dicta, the discussion of this traditional
right to freedom before conviction stressed the established position of
the court that pretrial bail should be denied only in the most extreme
cases. This interpretation of the case comports well with the theory
that there exists, apart from the eighth amendmeint, a traditional right
to pretrial liberty protected by the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
Those who favor preventive detention cite Carlson v. Landon,32 for
the proposition that Stack did not provide an absolute right to bail.33
Decided late in the October 1951 Term, Carlson appears to support the
position that there is a liberty interest in pretrial freedom not to be
denied without due process of law.34 Carlson dealt with the detention
of resident aliens suspected of subversive activities, pending deporta-
tion hearings.35
By act of Congress the Attorney General of the United States had
discretion to hold aliens, suspected of being communists, in custody
without bail pending a deportation hearing. 36 Detention was permitted
when there was reasonable cause to believe release on bail would en-
danger the safety and welfare of the United States. 37 The Supreme
Court held that detaining alien communists without bail did not consti-
tute a denial of due process if there was reason to believe their release
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution provide that no
person may be deprived of liberty without due process of law. In Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
5, 538 (1951), the United States Supreme Court indicated that an arbitrary or capricious denial
of bail would constitute a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Id. at 542; see also
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235 (1940). In Chambers the court stated that the constitu-
tional draftsmen included the due process clause in the Constitution to protect, at all times, per-
sons charged with or suspected of a crime. Id; see Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive
Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 380 (1970).
Since the Petition of Right of 1628, it is clear that the promise of the Magna Carta "that
no man shall be. . .taken nor imprisoned. . . without being brought in answer by due
process of law" applies to imprisonment before, as well as after, conviction.
Id.
32. 342 U.S. 524 (1951).
33. See Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEo. L. J. 1140, 1172-73 (1972);
Mitchell, supra note 13, at 1223-24.
34. See infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
35. 342 U.S. at 528-29.
36. 342 U.S. at 538-39.
37. 342 U.S. at 528 n.3.
Pac#Fc Law Journal / VoL 14
would pose a threat to the security of the nation." In order to under-
stand how Carlson affected the traditional right to pretrial bail recog-
nized in Stack, 9 it is important to identify the circumstances of the
Carlson case. Congress has always exercised broad authority to deter-
mine matters of immigration.40 Thus, alien residency became a matter
of statutory entitlement.41 The right to remain free on bail pending a
deportation hearing, therefore, would depend upon the terms of the
statutory entitlement.42 Congress could prescribe the conditions of
alien residency and actions or activities that would result in revocation
of resident status.43 By contrast, the Court in Stdck was concerned
with a criminal proceeding. The Stack Court had characterized the
right to be free on bailprior to a criminalproceeding as traditional in
our system of law.' It was emphasized in Carlson that deportation was
not a criminal proceeding and that it had never been held to be
punishment.45
In essence, Carlson strengthened the argument that an accused could
not be deprived of the traditional right to pretrial bail without due pro-
cess of law. 6 The Supreme Court noted that refusal of bail prior to
deportation did not violate the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment because the refusal was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 47 A logi-
cal inference to be drawn from this statement is that an arbitrary or
capricious decision to deny bail prior to a deportation hearing would
violate due process. As noted in Stack, the right to pretrial liberty is
traditional to our system of criminal jurisprudence, and preservation of
the right serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to trial.48
After Stack and Carlson it was clear that the Court was willing to
afford pretrial liberty greater protection than the right of aliens to re-
38. See generaly 342 U.S. at 537-41.
39. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
40. United States Constitution Article I, section 8, clause 4, gives Congress the power to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization. See NOWAK, supra note 25, at 591 n. 14. "Congress
does not derive its power to regulate immigration from a specific constitutional grant. It is simply
regarded as a power inherent to a sovereignty." Also, "In a long line of cases the Supreme Court
has stated that the power of Congress over the admission of aliens to this country is absolute." Id.
at 895; Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 585 (1889).
41. Id.
42. 342 U.S. at 537.
The power to expel aliens, beinq essentially a power of the political branches of govern-
ment, the legislative and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive officers,




44. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
45. 342 U.S. at 537.
46. See infra Note 47 and accompanying text.
47. See generally 342 U.S. at 537-41.
48. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
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main free pending a deportation hearing.49 Therefore, if an arbitrary
or capricious denial of bail pending deportation would violate due pro-
cess, the same would surely violate the traditional right to pretrial
bail.
50
Notice was taken in Stack that denial of the traditional right to pre-
trial bail could also undermine the presumption of innocence. 1 Left
unresolved was the issue of whether the presumption of innocence pro-
vided an independent constitutional safeguard for the right to bail or
merely presented a restatement of the rule that an accused could not be
denied pretrial liberty without due process of law. 2 This issue was to
be directly addressed in subsequent cases.
C Presumption of Innocence
In Bell v. Woo/fish,53 the Supreme Court noted, "In evaluating the
constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that
implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, we think that the proper _inquiry is whether those condi-
tions amount to punishment."54 In order to prevent punishment with-
out due process of law the court observed that the pretrial detainee
would have a bail hearing pursuant to 18 United States Code, Section
3146.55 18 U.S.C. 3146 allows pretrial detention only when there is fear
that the defendant will flee the jurisdiction if released on bail.56 Denial
of bail because of the type of offense charged, or the fashion in which it
is committed, would result in pretrial confinement. This confinement
would constitute punishment prior to a showing of guilt. As a result
there would be a violation of the presumed innocence of the defendant
and due process of law.
49. This inference can be drawn from the fact that the Supreme Court in Stack held bail
could only be set prior to a criminal proceeding in an amount designed to assure the defendant's
attendance at trial. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5. Carlson held that aliens could be completely denied bail
prior to a deportation hearing as long as the denial was not arbitrary or capricious. Carlson, 342
U.S. at 538.
50. See also United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784, 787-88 (1971).
51. Stack, 342 U.S. at 4.
52. See Hruska, supra note 3, at 48-49 [citing, the President's Commission on Crime in the
District of Columbia, Report 520 (1966)].
53. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
54. Id. at 536. In essence the Supreme. Court was indicating that the popular notion of an
accused's innocence prior to a showing of guilt was in fact a due process right which prevented the
state from punishing a defendant prior to conviction. With the foregoing understanding in mind,
this due process pretrial protection against punishment will be hereinafter referred to as the "pre-
sumed innocence of the defendant." See Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
The statutes of the United States have been framed upon the theory that a person ac-
cused of crime shall not, until he has been finally adjudged guilty in the court of last
resort, be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or punishment.
Id.
55. 441 U.S. at 537.
56. 18 U.S.C. §3146 (1976).
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i the wake of Stack, courts have consistently held that denial of
pretrial bail in an arbitrary or capricious fashion will deprive an ac-
cused due process of law. 7 The presumed innocence of the defendant
prohibits courts from detaining an accused solely on the grounds of the
nature of the crime charged prior to a showing of guilt.5 8 Both of the
foregoing protections recognize that there is a liberty interest in pretrial
freedom which may not be deprived without due process of law. The
question to be resolved is the amount of weight which should be af-
forded the pretrial liberty interest.5 9
California has enacted a broad statutory scheme providing for pre-
ventive detention through Proposition 4. The constitutionality of Prop-
osition 4 is questionable in light of the great protection the Supreme
Court has always afforded the right to pretrial bail. The next section
will trace those developments which have led certain Federal circuit
courts to conclude that the due process liberty interest in pretrial bail
has evolved into a fundamental right.60
BAIL As A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The importance of categorizing bail as a fundamental right lies in the
fact that courts will apply strict scrutiny to any attempt by the state to
deny pretrial liberty.61 Normally, a state need only show that legisla-
tive action bears a rational relationship to a legitimate end not prohib-
ited by the Constitution.62 Where government action impinges upon
the exercise of a fundamental right, the Supreme Court ". . .will not
accept every permissible government purpose as sufficient. . ., but will
instead require the government to show that it is pursuing a compelling
or overriding end--one whose value is so great that it justifies the limi-
tation of fundamental constitutional values." 63 Even if the government
can demonstrate a compelling state interest, the Supreme Court will
still require proof that the state action is the least restrictive means
available to promote that interest.64 When alternative, less restrictive
57. See Keating, 322 F. Supp. at 786-87; Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.
1964).
58. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
59. See, NowAK, supra note 25, at 524.
60. See infra notes 67-110 and accompanying text.




Even if the government can demonstrate such [compelling] an end, the Court will not
uphold the classification unless the justices have independently reached the conclusion
that the classification is necessary to promote that compelling interest. If the justices are
of the opinion that the classification need not be employed to achieve such an end, the
law will be held to violate the equal protection guarantee. Under the due process guar-
1983 / Proposition Four
means are available, the Supreme Court will not allow fundamental
rights to be denied.65
A. Historical Development
After the decisions in Stack and Carlson the theory that the right to
pretrial bail was fundamental in nature manifested itself as a basic con-
stitutional protection.66 Justice Douglas supplemented the position of
the Supreme Court that bail was basic to the American system of crimi-
nal jurisprudence with language such as: "The shadow of a doubt
across one's own conclusions is itself sufficient to grant application for
bail.. "67 and; "Doubt whether bail should be granted or denied
should always be resolved in favor of the defendant.
68
While addressing the basic nature of bail in Cohen v. United States,
69
Justice Douglas affirmed that the nature of the crime should not affect
the right to bail.70 Nevertheless, the right to bail has generally been
couched in conditional language. In recognition of the importance of
pretrial bail Justice Douglas stated, "The fundamental tradition in this
country is that one charged with a crime is not, in ordinary circum-
stances, imprisoned until after a showing of guilt."'" Extraordinary cir-
cumstances which warrant denial of pretrial bail, must still be balanced
against the constitutional directive that the right to bail is a fundamen-
tal tradition and basic to our system of law. Proponents of preventive
detention also use the language of Justice Douglas in Carbo v. United
States72 as support for their position.73 Carbo dealt with an applica-
tion for bail pending appeal following convictions for racketeering, ex-
tortion, and conspiracy.74 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
46(a)(2)75 provides that bail is discretionary after a showing of guilt.
Justice Douglas was cautious to point out that even in the exercise of
antee the Court will employ this level of strict scrutiny only in reviewing legislation
which limits fundamental constitutional rights.
Id.
65. Id.
66. See infra notes 67-110 and accompanying text.
67. Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955) cert. denied,
352 U.S. 844 (1956).
68. Id.
69. 82 S. Ct. 8 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1955) cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962).
70. Id. at 9. "Equal Justice under the law requires that bail not be denied even a notorious
law-violator if he has a substantial question to be resolved on appeal." Id. The same logic would
apply when someone was merely charged with committing a notorious crime taking into consider-
ation the additional safeguard afforded by the presumption of innocence.
71. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1960).
72. 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962). Application for review of the Circuit Judge
denying bail pending appeal is denied 369 U.S. 868 (1962).
73. See generally Hruska, supra note 3; Mitchell, supra note 13.
74. Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 663.
75. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(2) provides that "Bail may be allowed pend-
ing appeal or certiorari unless it appears that the appeal is frivolous or taken for delay."
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discretion, the likelihood of repetition of acts charged as unlawful was
* too restrictive a standard upon which to deny bail.76 Community senti-
ment or evil reputation could never play a role in the determination of
whether to grant or deny bail, especially when the crimes were of a
political nature." As for the impact on the basic right to pretrial bail,
Carbo should have only limited value. Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 46(a)(1) 78 was recognized by the court as providing mandatory
pretrial bail.79 In particular the court held that, "Bail should not be
granted where the offense of which the defendant has been convicted is
an atrocious one."80 If the defendant were merely charged with an
atrocious offense, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(a)(1) would
have required pretrial release on bail.
As for the effect Carbo had on pretrial preventive detention, two
principles can be derived. First, if the Court was willing to afford bail
pending appeal from a conviction such careful scrutiny, when it was a
matter of discretion by statute, pretrial denial of bail would obviously
only be allowed in the most extreme situations.8" Further, it was clear
that preventive detention was not going to be allowed merely on the
basis of the nature of the crime charged. 2 Fear that an atrocious act
would be repeated was found to be too restrictive a standard on which
to deny bail pending appeal after a showing of guilt. Therefore, denial
of pretrial bail purely on the basis of the atrocious offense alleged
would not only be too'restrictive a standard but would also constitute
punishment before a showing of guilt. The presumed innocence of the
defendant is designed to protect against exactly this type of pretrial
punishment.83 In Carbo the Court also indicated that the right to bail
could not be denied because of community sentiment, especially when
the crime charged was of a political nature.8 4 Any scheme of pretrial
preventive detention designed to deny bail purely on the basis of the
crime charged was obviously going to meet strong opposition.
76. Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 667.
77. Id. at 665.
78. Rule 46(a)(1) provides:
A person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted to bail. A
person arrested for an offense punishable by death may be admitted to bail by any court
or judge authorized by law to do so in the exercise of discretion, giving due weight to the
evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the offense.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(1).
79. Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 666.
80. Id. at 666.
81. Id. at 668. ("Keeping a defendant in custody during the trial 'to render fruitless' any
attempt to interfere with witnesses or jurors... may, in the extreme or unusual case, justify
denial of bail.").
82. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
84. Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 667.
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In the wake of Carbo it became apparent that the Supreme Court
was willing to deal with preventive detention only after a showing of
guilt and when it was a matter of discretion by statute." A showing of
guilt could be considered probative of the danger an individual posed
to the community. 6 Even with this indication of dangerous propen-
sity, statutes still provided that a defendant was entitled to freedom if
there was a substantial question to be resolved on appeal after convic-
tion.87 The Supreme Court was consistent in its refusal to grant certio-
rari to decisions which held the right to bail was fundamental in nature
and basic to our system of law.88 The right was indicated to be tradi-
tional 9 or inherent in our concept of ordered liberty.90 No mention
had yet been made that the eighth amendment itself secured pretrial
bail as a fundamental right.
B. Modern Trend
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has in theory identi-
fied a right as fundamental by determining whether it is inherent in our
concept of ordered liberty.91 The Court has done this in practice by
85. This inference can be drawn from the fact that after the decisions in Stack v. Carbo the
Supreme Court consistently denied certiorari to the opinions of Justice Douglas sitting as a Circuit
Justice. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text. See Comment, supra note 3, at 331 n.17.
"The Supreme Court has applied the Eighth Amendment bail clause only in cases arising out of
federal statutes." Id.
86. Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 666.
Bail should not be granted where the offense of which the defendant has been convicted
is an atrocious one, and there is danger that if he is given his freedom he will commit
another of like character.
Id.
87. Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 666; D-igh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994, id at 996 (Warren, Circuit
Justice 1962). Chief Justice Warren held that even the right to bail pending appeal was basic to
our system of law. Id. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)2.
88. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
89. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
90. Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
91. See generally, infra notes 92-105 and accompanying text. Traditionally the United States
Supreme Court would in theory identify a right as fundamental by determining whether it was
inherent to our concept of ordered liberty. Palco v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1959). The court
has done this in practice by selectively incorporating specific rights embodied in the Bill of Rights.
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In both Duncan v. Louisiana and Crist v.
Bety, 437 U.S. 28 (1978), the court looked to the historical development of fundamental principles
to determine whether or not certain procedural guarantees constituted fundamental rights. Using
this analysis, one author has argued Duncan compels the incorporation of an eighth amendment
right to bail. See Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bal Historical Perspectives, 82
COLUtM. L. REV. 328, 354-56 (1982). In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, id at 486 (1965),
the court indicated that the fundamental rights inherent in the concept of ordered liberty are
broader than the specified rights appearing in the Bill of Rights. ld. One author has argued
that the right to bail is within the penumbia of rights emanating from the eighth amendment's
preoccupation against excessiveness. See Miller, Preventive Detention-A Guide to the Eradication
of Individual Rights, 16 How. L.J. 1, 10-12 (1970). Griswold v. Connecticut also recognized that
there existed fundamental rights that existed simply in the concept of ordered liberty. See 381
U.S. at 486. This language has been used to describe the right to bail. See Mastrian v. Hedman,
326 F.2d 708, 710 (1964).
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selectively incorporating specific rights embodied in the Bill of Rights
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.92 As a result,
if states were to deny a fundamental right, they would be depriving a
person of due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment.93 This practice of identifying rights as fundamental and protect-
ing those rights against state action through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment has come to be known as the incorporation
doctrine.94 As noted earlier, the right to pretrial bail is a liberty interest
which may not be deprived by the state without due process of law.9"
A conclusion that the eighth amendment has been "incorporated"
through the fourteenth amendment would mean that the Supreme
Court would apply strict scrutiny to any attempt to deny pretrial bail.96
Professors Nowak, Rotunda, and Young (hereinafter cited as Nowak)
note, "The Supreme Court has applied most of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights to the states because it found them to be fundamental to
the American system of government and inherent in the concept of or-
dered liberty under the due process clause." 97 By way of example, No-
wak presupposes that the right to bail is a fundamental right which has
been "incorporated" into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Nowak states, ". . . if the State or Federal government
were [sic] to deny to a specific class of persons the right to bail upon
certain criminal charges, the classification should be analyzed to deter-
mine the compatibility of the law with the substantive guarantees of the
eighth amendment prohibition of excessive bail." 98 In essence, Nowak
suggests that the denial of bail by the state should be treated as the
denial of a fundamental right.
The special treatment afforded pretrial liberty by the Supreme Court
has prompted the Second, Third, Fifth and Eighth Circuits to conclude
that the eighth amendment bail clause has been incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment due process clause.99 As a result of this incor-




95. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 25 and 64 and accompanying text.
97. See NOWAK, supra note 25, at 524.
98. Id. at 674-75.
99. Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d 64, 66 (3d. Cir. 1981) ("The excessive bail provision of the
Eighth Amendment is applicable to states pursuant to the due process clause of the 14th amend-
ment'); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1164-65 (8th Cir. 1981), vacatedas moot sub. nom. Murphy
v. Hunt, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S. March 2, 1982) (the portion of Article 1, section 9 of the Ne-
braska Constitution denying bail to persons charged with certain sexual offenses violates the
eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, as incorporated in the fourteenth amend-
ment."); See United States ex rel. Goodman v. Kehle, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2nd Cir. 1972).
No constitutional distinction exists between requiring excessive bail and denying bail
altogether, in absence of legitimate reasons, and thus, under the Eighth Amendment
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poration the four circuits maintain that denial of pretrial bail by the
states violates a fundamental right protected by the eighth amend-
ment.1°° The Third Circuit held that the eighth amendment had been
incorporated in Sistrunk v. Lyons. 101 In Sistrunk, Duncan v. Louisi-
ana 0 2 was cited for the proposition that when determining whether a
right is fundamental, the true inquiry is, "whether a right is among
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions. . .whether it is basic in our
system of jurisprudence. . .and whether it is a fundamental right es-
sential to a fair trial."' 3 Application of this test, and a comparison to
other fundamental rights led the Sistrunk court to the conclusion that
the eighth amendment had been incorporated through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment." ° Furthermore, denial of bail
purely because of the nature of the offense charged has been held to
impinge upon this fundamental right to bail.105
In Sistrunk two Supreme Court cases were noted for their recogni-
tion of the incorporation of the eighth amendment. The Sistrunk court
stated, "The Supreme Court has to a considerable extent foreshadowed
its position on this important subject by stating in Schilb v. Kuebel,
(citation omitted), that
'[b]ail, of course is basic to our system of law, (citing cases), and the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of excessive bail has been assumed
to have application to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
.. .[t]he Supreme Court has recently noted that it continues to adhere
to this assumption as a fundamental means for protection against dep-
rivations of liberty without due process of law. See Baker v. McCollum,
(citation omitted)."" °  Incorporation of the eighth amendment was
clearly considered a closed question on the part of the Sistrunk court.
In light of these developments it must be remembered that even courts
holding that the right to bail is inherent in our concept of ordered lib-
where bail is fixed, it must not be excessive, and even where bail is not a matter of right,
a state court may not deny it arbitrarily or capriciously.
Id;see also Henderson v. Dutton, 397 F.2d 375, 377 (5th Cir. 1968).
100. See generally discussion of incorporation, NOWAK, supra note 25, at 376.
101. 646 F.2d 64 (3rd. Cir. 1981).
102. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
103. Id. at 148-149.
104. 646 F.2d at 67-69.
105. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d at 1164-1165 ("Article I, section 9 of the Nebraska Constitu-
tion denying bail to persons charged with certain sexual offenses violates the Eighth Amendment
as incorporated through the Fourteenth"); NOWAK, supra note 25, at 674-675.
106. Sistrunk v. Lyons, 646 F.2d at 67; see, NOWAK, supra note 25, at 415. "The cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment has been specifically made applicable to the
states by the Supreme Court and the excessive bail provision has been made applicable by impli-
cation." Id.
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erty and protected by the eighth and fourteenth amendments, have ac-
knowledged that pretrial bail could be denied in some instances.10 7
Arguably, it is self evident that under certain circumstances protec-
tion of society from dangerous individuals does constitute a compelling
state interest. Any statutory scheme of incarcerating people prior to a
showing of guilt must be subjected to strict scrutiny. To permit other-
wise, would make a mockery of both the preferential treatment the
Supreme Court has afforded the right to pretrial bail and the presumed
innocence of the defendant.108 If bail were not recognized as a funda-
mental right, arbitrariness could be introduced into the detention of
individuals accused of a crime where the state has yet to carry the bur-
den of proving guilt.109 Not only is this contrary to our collective un-
derstanding of the criminal justice system, it creates a situation where
persons who expound unpopular political beliefs could be unfairly sin-
gled out for denial of bail." 0 Finally, infringement upon the right to
pretrial bail in the absence of a compelling state interest would foster
distrust and disillusionment with the fairness of the criminal justice sys-
tem. The obvious solution to these problems would be an express hold-
ing by the Supreme Court that pretrial liberty is a fundamental right
which is protected against state action by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
C Fundamental Right to Bail and Legislation
Doubt as to the constitutionality of pretrial preventive detention was
reflected in the Bail Reform Act of 1966.111 Pretrial release was made
mandatory with minimal safeguards to assure attendance at trial, in all
noncapital cases." 2 Again, detention on the theory that an individual
posed a threat to community safety was permitted only after a convic-
tion and where there was no substantial question on appeal." 3 Legisla-
tive intent behind the Bail Reform Act indicated congressional
uncertainty as to the exact parameters of our traditional right to pretrial
bail." 4 Reference was made to the Judiciary Act of 1789 which made
107. See Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (1963); Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d at 1160.
108. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
109. In the absence of review by strict judicial scrutiny the state would only have to show a
rational basis for pretrial detention. The amount of discretion given magistrates under the ra-
tional basis test could lead to denial of bail for arbitrary reasons, such as, to give the defendant a
taste ofjail. See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail II, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1125, 1167-
68 (1965).
110. This concern was first voiced in Carbo v. U.S., 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice
1962).
I1l. Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 STAT. 214-16 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§3146-3151 (1976)).
112. 18 U.S.C. 3146 (1976).
113. Id. §3148 (1976).
114. 1966 U.S. CODE AND CONG. & AD. NEws, Vol. 2 2293, 2295.96.
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pretrial bail a matter of right in noncapital cases.1 15 As a result of the
failure of the Supreme Court to place a clear line of demarcation be-
tween an individual's right to freedom before trial and the interest of
society in preventive detention, Congress limited the act to bail
reform.' 
16
In 1969 Senate Bill 2600117 was introduced to Congress in an attempt
to institute a statutory scheme for pretrial preventive detention. The
proposal was opposed by such notable figures as Senator Sam Ervin,
former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and organizations such as the
Bar Association of New York City and the National Bar Associa-
tion."18 Opposition centered around the belief that fear for community
safety was not a legitimate basis for denial of pretrial freedom. '" As a
result of this opposition the bill was sent to the Judiciary Committee
and no action was taken.'
20
Thus, legislators were mired in a state of uncertainty. Elected repre-
sentatives became hesitant to enact schemes of pretrial preventive de-
tention because of the confusion surrounding the fundamental nature
of the right to bail.' 2 1 As a result of this confusion Congress enacted a
statutory scheme for preventive detention in the District of Columbia
that by its structure recognized bail as a fundamental right.
1 22
D. Preventive Detention in the District of Columbia
Congress predicted that a pretrial preventive detention scheme
would have to pass strict judicial scrutiny when it passed the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.23 This
conclusion is drawn from an analysis of the internal safeguards im-
posed against complete discretion in the denial of pretrial bail. All
criminal violations in the District of Columbia are federal crimes.'24 In
other federal districts most crimes are prosecuted in state courts.' 25 As
a result of this distinction Congress chose the District of Columbia as a
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. S.B. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. S 7908-09 (daily ed.
July 11, 1969). See generally Comment, Preventive Detention and the ProposedAmendments to the
Bail ReformAct of 1966, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 525 (1970).
118. Preventive Detentiomn Hearings Before the Subcomr' on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1187 (1970). See Ervin, Foreward Preventive
Dentention-A Step BackwardFor Criminal Justice, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 291 (March 1971).
119. Id.
120. See, Kennedy, supra note 22, at 429.
121. See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 123-137 and accompanying text.
123. Pub. L. No. 91-358, §210(a), 84 Stat. 644 (codified at D.C. CODE ENCLY. §23-1322 (West
Supp. 1970)).
124. See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 429.
125. Id.
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testing ground for the first pretrial preventive detention program in the
country.
26
'The District of Columbia statutory scheme permits the federal dis-
trict court to incarcerate an accused prior to trial if the accused is
(1) charged with a dangerous crime and the government certifies that
the suspect's past andpresent behavior indicates there are no release
conditions which will insure the safety of the community;' 27 or (2) if
the suspect is charged with a violent crime within the past ten years or
has allegedly committed the present crime while on bail or proba-
tion;128 or (3) if the suspect is charged with any offense and for the
purpose of obstructing or attempting to obstruct justice, [he] threatens,
injures, intimidates or attempts any of the foregoing with any prospec-
tive witness or juror.129 This statute further provides there must be a
hearing and the magistrate must find there is no combination of release
conditions that will ensure the safety of the community. 3 Finally, if
the court orders pretrial detention, the defendant's case must be tried
within sixty days.' 3' In Blunt v. United States,'32 it was held that this
statutory scheme satisfied the requirements of fundamental fairness
and did not deprive the defendant of due process. Blunt, however,
must be contrasted with Campbell v. McGruder33 which held that ab-
sent a specific constitutional violation, the constitutionality of the Dis-
trict of Columbia scheme for pretrial detention can be measured only
by balancing the liberty interests of the pretrial detainee against the
need of the state to protect the safety of the community. 34 The ques-
tion left to be answered was how much weight should be placed on the
liberty interest of an accused awaiting trial. A close analysis of the
D.C. scheme supports the logical inference that Congress believed pre-
trial detention would have to pass strict judicial scrutiny. Sections (1)-
(3) place the burden on the state to prove very specific circumstances
exist, before bail can be denied. A judge is not given absolute discre-
tion to deny pretrial bail.
Arguably, all three of the instances in which pretrial bail may be
denied pose a compelling state interest. These limitations on the ability
to deny pretrial bail recognize the special treatment pretrial bail has
received from the Supreme Court. Further, detention will not be al-
126. Id.





132. Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (App. D. C. 1974).
133. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
134. Id. at 529.
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lowed where a combination of bail conditions will serve to protect the
community.' 35 The D.C. scheme, thus, requires there be a showing that
no less restrictive means are available to protect the community.
Where state action does not impinge upon a fundamental right only a
rational basis between the means and goal need be shown. 136 The ad-
ditional safeguards afforded the right to pretrial bail in the D.C.
scheme renders the conclusion that Congress anticipated more than a
rational basis would be necessary to deny the right. Before bail may be
denied a hearing is required and any order of detention must be ac-
companied by written findings of fact and the reasons for its entry.
137
This avoids any arbitrary or capricious decisions, insuring due process
protection for the right to bail.
1 38
Preventive detention in the District of Columbia provides California
with an example of enabling legislation which could be adopted to im-
plement Proposition 4. In the absence of such legislation, however, it is
prudent to anticipate the conflicts Proposition 4 will pose to existing
case law.
E. Statutory Considerations
Whether or not the circuit courts are correct in concluding that the
eighth amendment has been incorporated into the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, it appears that the Supreme Court will only
allow pretrial preventive detention in the most extreme circum-
stances. 139 Apart from the eighth amendment, it has been shown that
the due process clauses provide protection against deprivation of pre-
trial liberty. 14 ° Bail may never be denied solely because of the nature of
the crime charged.141 Such a denial would inflict punishment before
trial.' 42 Protection against pretrial punishment is secured through due
process. 143 Any deprivation of pretrial liberty through the denial of
bail is always without due process except to the extent it is necessary to
serve an important state interest. 144 Even if an important state interest
exists, a court still cannot deny bail in an arbitrary or capricious
135. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
136. See NowAX, supra note 25, at 524.
137. D. C. CODE ENCYCL. §23-1322(b)(3).
138. If there is no requirement that the court identify the reasons for pretrial detention, there
will be no sure way of determining the basis for the denial of bail.
139. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 668 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962), cer. denied
369 U.S. 865 (1962); see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
140. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 70 and 105 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
144. Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 1001 (1976).
Pac#7c Law Journal / Vol 14
fashion. 145
A precarious balance has existed since Stack between an individual's
right to freedom before trial and the interest society has in preventive
detention. In the past California has treated pretrial bail as a funda-
mental right by making it mandatory in all noncapital cases. 146 With
the passage of Proposition 4, far greater discretion is placed in the
hands of the trial court to deprive an individual of his or her liberty
prior to a showing of guilt. If the argument is accepted that pretrial
bail exists as a fundamental right, it will be necessary to pass enabling
legislation to insure that Proposition 4 passes strict judicial scrutiny. It
is strongly recommended that the California Legislature enact a pre-
ventive detention scheme based on the one presently operating in the
District of Columbia. As the next section will illustrate, adoption of a
statutory scheme which recognizes bail as a fundamental right could
save preventive detention in California.
PROPOSITION 4
A. Due Process Considerations
Proposition 4147 provides that bail may be denied in a felony offense
involving an act of violence on another person. 48 The court must find
that (1) facts are evident or presumption great the accused committed
the crime and (2) there is a substantial likelihood the person's release
would result in great bodily harm to others. 149 Ordinarily, when per-
sons are charged with a crime they are brought before a magistrate
within a reasonable time period and arraigned. 50 In the case of an
indigent, counsel is not appointed until the arraignment.151 At the time
of the arraignment the court makes a preliminary decision as to bail.'
52
Prior to the arraignment no hearing has been held to determine if the
facts are evident or presumption great that the accused has committed
the offense.' 53 Due to time constraints it is unlikely in the usual case
that the District Attorney will have been able to develop evidence of
the dangerous propensity of the accused. Therefore, the only fact pro-
145. See United States exrel Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784 (D.D.C. 1971); Goodman
v. Kehle, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2nd Cir. 1972) ("even where bail is not a matter of right a state court
may not deny it arbitrarily or capriciously").
146. Cal. Const. Article I Sec. 12.
147. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, §12.
148. Id. §12(b).
149. Id.
150. See Note, supra note 3, at 330-31.
151. B. WlTKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 351-55 (1963).
152. See supra note 150.
153. Proposition 4 does not expressly provide for a hearing to determine if facts are evident or
the presumption great.
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bative of the threat the accused passes to the community will be the
nature of the offense charged. Proposition 4 does not expressly provide
for a bail hearing separate from the arraignment. As a result, a defend-
ant could be denied bail at the arraignment solely because of the nature
and circumstances of the offense charged. Failure to set bail because of
the nature of the offense charged violates the presumed innocence of
the defendant. 5 4 This would occur because the defendant would be
punished for a crime the state has yet to prove he committed. In Hunt
v. Roth '" the Eighth Circuit Court operated on the assumption that the
eighth amendment had been incorporated, and held that denial of bail
based on the nature of the crime charged would impinge upon a funda-
mental right and deny equal protection.
Even if it is not accepted that pretrial bail is a fundamental right, due
process will require a Proposition 4 bail hearing, designed to develop
evidence of a dangerous propensity, be held prior to or concurrently
with the arraignment.' 56 Otherwise, the court may only have evidence
of the nature of the crime charged at the time of the arraignment, and
the magistrate would be required to grant bail and set it in an amount
that was not excessive."' Since fear of flight is the only factor to be
considered in setting bail, the magistrate would be unable to consider
community safety when determining the amount of the bond. 158 Thus,
failure to hold a bail hearing prior to or concurrent with the arraign-
ment at which time evidence of dangerous propensity could be devel-
oped, would defeat the purpose of preventive detention. For these
reasons it is strongly suggested that the Proposition 4 bail hearing be
held at the time of arraignment for those defendants who have secured
counsel, and within a short period of time after arraignment for de-
fendants who are appointed counsel. In either case defendants should
be granted bail if the only evidence available at the time of the hearing
is the nature of the crime charged.
It will be incumbent upon the courts and Legislature to define proce-
dural requirements for a hearing. Proposition 4 requires the state to
prove by "clear and convincing evidence there is a substantial likeli-
hood that the accused's release would result in great bodily harm to
154. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
155. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt, 50
U.S.L.W.4264 (U.S. March 2, 1982).
156. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
157. Both Proposition 4 and the eighth amendment provide that once a decision to grant bail
has been made, the amount shall not be excessive. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) held that any
amount of bail in excess of that required to assure the defendant's appearance at trial is excessive.
Id. at 5.
158. Id.
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others."' 159 Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as, "clear,
explicit, and unequivocal, so clear as to leave no substantial doubt and
sufficiently strong to demand the unhesitating assent of every reason-
able mind."'160 This definite and exact standard of clear and convinc-
ing evidence, is only required to show that, there is a substantial
likelihood release of that defendant poses a threat to the community.
Arguably, it is an anomaly that the court is required to make an une-
quivocal finding that there is only a probability of danger.
Recognition of the fundamental nature of pretrial bail requires the
state to show by clear and convincing evidence that release of the de-
fendant will in fact pose a threat to the community. A lesser standard
undermines the great deference the Supreme Court has always afforded
the right to pretrial liberty and gives the magistrate the ability to deny
bail in the absence of a compelling state interest. Under Proposition 4
the burden to produce clear and convincing evidence of dangerous pro-
pensity is placed on the state.161 The issue thus revolves around what
standards will be employed to sustain a prediction or finding of danger-
ous propensity. There exists a clear constitutional standard that once a
decision to grant bail is made, any amount higher than that required to
secure the appearance of the defendant is excessive.162 Proposition 4
only requires that the court consider the seriousness of the offense
charged, previous criminal record, and probability of appearance, in
setting the amount of bail. Practically speaking since fear of flight is
the only factor to be considered in setting bail, the court is not required
to look at seriousness of the offense charged, previous criminal record
or probability of appearance, until after it has determined the accused
does not pose a threat to the community. This raises the issue of what
standards the courts will use in determining dangerous propensity.
Predicting future human behavior is an insurmountable task even for
those who are experts in the field. Therefore, judges who have little
expertise in this area are faced with obvious problems. As one leading
scholar has stated:
We know almost nothing in criminology about the factors that distin-
guish those few accused robbers or rapists who will commit a crime
on pretrial liberty from the majority of the accused robbers and rap-
ists who will not commit such a crime on pretrial liberty. To imagine
that, at a preliminary hearing soon after arrest a judge could make a
reliable determination about an accused's future dangerousness
when very little data about the accused will then be available to him,
159. CAL. CONST. art 1, §12.
160. People v. Carruso, 68 Cal. 2d 183, 190, 436 P.2d 336, 341, 65 Cal. Rptr. 336, 341 (1967).
161. Seesupra note 2.
162. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
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and we do not know what that little data means anyway, it seems to
me is to indulge in pure fantasy. 63
Another scholar has stated:
Unless something more precise than bad reputation and bad pros-
pects' 4 is required probably a majority of all defendants would be
detainable and the decision from among this group of whom to de-
tain and whom to free would turn not on legal standards relevant to
the state's legitimate objective but rather on the vagaries of judicial
temperament or the masking of illicit objectives, for example to give
the defendant a taste of jail.1
65
At the present time, the ability to predict human behavior has not been
reduced to an exact science. At the very least previous criminal record
and evidence of prior offenses committed on bail should be considered
in determining dangerous propensity. Failure to require these factors
be considered before denying bail evidences the shallow underpinnings
of Proposition 4, and increases the likelihood bail will be denied when
there is no real threat posed to the safety of the community in general
or victims and witnesses in particular.
B. Witness and Victim Intimidation
Witness and victim intimidation by one accused of a crime is another
situation contemplated by Proposition 4. Subsection (c) permits pre-
ventive detention in violent or non-violent felonies where there is clear
and convincing evidence the accused has threatened another and a sub-
stantial likelihood the threat will be carried out. Again, Proposition 4
will allow denial of pretrial bail where there is only a substantial likeli-
hood that danger exists. In light of Carbo v. United States 66 the ability
of a court to deny bail in this situation must be questioned. Carbo
cautioned that, "keeping a defendant in custody during the trial to
'render fruitless' any attempt to interfere with witnesses or jurors may,
in the extreme or unusual case, justify denial of bal."'167 A showing of
163. See Comment, supra note 51, at 844.
164. The court in Carbo v. U.S., 82 S. Ct. 662, 665 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962) cautioned
that bail is not to be denied merely because of the community's sentiment against the accused nor
because of an evil reputation.
165. See FOOTE, supra note 109, at 1167-68; Comment, Preventive Detention Befre Trial, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1489, 1493 (1966) ("Present system provides little protection for the accused who is
thought to be dangerous. He is subject to an inevitably hurried, unscientific and unreviewable
conjecture by prosecutors and magistrates about his proclivities for crime."). Sellers v. U.S., 89 S.
Ct. 36, 38 (Black, Circuit Justice 1968).
Idea that it would be "dangerous" in general to allow applicant to be at large must-if it
is ever a justifiable ground for denying bail as distinguished from separate proceeding
for bond to keep the peace-relate to some kind of danger that so jeopardizes the public
that the only way to protect against it would be to keep applicant in jail.
166. 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962).
167. 82 S. Ct. at 668.
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substantial likelihood falls short of constituting an extreme or unusual
case because bail can be denied when there is only a probability a wit-
ness or victim will be intimidated. Pursuant to the Carbo standard, bail
should not be denied under Proposition 4 unless there is clear and con-
vincing evidence the defendant will in fact pose a threat to a victim or
witness if released prior to trial. A mere showing of substantial likeli-
hood would emasculate the standard that bail only be denied in an
extreme or unusual case. Further, absent a requirement that reasons
for denial of bail be stated in writing, it is highly unlikely an appellate
court reviewing the denial will be able to determine if even a substan-
tial likelihood did in fact exist.
C. Written Statement of Reasons
Another serious deficiency of Proposition 4 obviously is the failure to
require a written statement of reasons for denial of pretrial bail. Due
process requires that pretrial bail never be denied in an arbitrary or
capricious fashion.'68 This due process consideration has led one fed-
eral court which recognizes the binding nature of the eighth amend-
ment on the states to hold, "[t]hat the state court's failure to provide
any basis for its decision to deny pretrial bail creates a presumption of
arbitrariness."' 69 For example, the District of Columbia scheme re-
quires that an order of pretrial detention be accompanied by written
findings of fact and the reason for its entry. 170 Even with the safeguard
of a written statement, certain scholars who adhere to the notion that
bail is a fundamental right, believe the District of Columbia scheme
still violates due process. 171 At the very least failure to provide a writ-
ten statement of reasons for denial of pretrial bail hinders an appellate
court in the task of determining whether the denial was arbitrary or
capricious. If strict scrutiny is applied by an appellate court reviewing
a denial of bail, a written statement of reasons will be vital to the deter-
mination of whether denial was based on a compelling state interest.
In contrast, even where there is a presumption of regularity in the de-
nial of bail after conviction pending appeal, courts have held, "it is
undoubtedly advisable that the court state the reasons for denial in a
separate document or in a clearly identifiable place in the record.' 72
This suggestion is made in order to insure that bail after conviction
pending appeal not be denied arbitrarily or unreasonably.
168. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
169. United States ex rel. Keating v. Bensinger, 322 F. Supp. 784, 787 (1971).
170. D. C. CODE ENCYCL. §23-1322(b)(3).
171. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
172. See Finetti v. Harris, 609 F.2d 599-600 (1979).
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In an attempt to protect against an arbitrary denial of pretrial bail,
especially where no specific standards for a finding of dangerous pro-
pensity are proposed by Proposition 4, it is strongly recommended that
a written statement of reasons be prepared to accompany an order of
detention. The written statement would serve both the purpose of re-
butting any presumption of arbitrariness and provide a basis for an
appellate court to determine whether a compelling state interest exists.
As a result of this written statement, a state would better insure that a
truly dangerous individual could be denied pretrial liberty in a consti-
tutional manner. In the absence of a written statement the same truly
dangerous individual could be released because of the failure of a de-
tention order to survive strict scrutiny.
The foregoing section has illustrated situations in which the opera-
tion of Proposition 4 could deny an accused the exercise of a funda-
mental right and due process of law. Another consideration is whether
or not the denial of pretrial bail will deprive an accused equal protec-
tion of the law.
D. Equal Protection
As previously noted certain courts and commentators have adopted
the theory that an eighth amendment right to bail has been incorpo-
rated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 173 This
has resulted in the presumed existence of a fundamental right to pre-
trial bail.1 74 Nowak notes in the treatise on constitutional law, that if
the fundamental right to bail, protected against state action by the sub-
stantive guarantees of the eighth amendment, were to be denied to a
class of persons, this would deprive the class equal protection of the
law.175 Thus, if all persons accused of a sex crime were to be denied the
fundamental right to pretrial bail, by a state, they would be denied
equal protection of the law.1 76 Denial of equal protection by the states
is subjected to strict judicial scrutiny when fundamental rights are im-
pinged or a suspect class discriminated against. 177 Strict scrutiny re-
quires the state to carry the burden of showing there is a compelling
interest for denying pretrial liberty and no less restrictive means avail-
able to accomplish this end. 178 Since Proposition 4 attempts to deny
bail to a class of persons charged with a felony involving a violent act,
173. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; infra note 176 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
175. See NOWAK, supra note 25, at 675.
176. Id.
177. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Nowak, supra note 25 at 524-25.
178. Id.
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while admitting to bail individuals accused of nonviolent felonies, there
is a possibility it may deny equal protection of the law. Further, once
subjected to an equal protection analysis, Proposition 4 poses a critical
problem. A literal reading of the proposition gives the committing
magistrate complete discretion to release any defendant on his or her
own recognizance while detaining others. Thus, persons in a similar
situation can be treated in a dissimilar fashion.
There is no conditional language surrounding the court's ability to
grant an own recognizance release. The only mandatory wording in
Proposition 4 is that "[a] person shall be released on bail by sufficient
sureties." Denial of bail is subjugated to the preceding clause. There-
fore, a plain reading of Proposition 4 indicates that the ability to deny
bail for dangerous propensity is permissive, not mandatory. In effect
Proposition 4 would allow the judge to release a defendant on his or
her own recognizance even after presentation of clear and convincing
evidence that there is a substantial likelihood he or she will pose a
threat to the community. As a result, an individual accused of rape in
Los Angeles with two prior convictions for rape while released on bail
could be deprived of pretrial liberty, while one accused of rape with the
same prior convictions in Sacramento could be released on his or her
own recognizance. Although this is an extreme example, Proposition 4
provides no internal safeguard against this type of discriminatory treat-
ment. Despite the fact that Proposition 4 can, as the foregoing example
illustrates, be exercised in a discriminatory fashion, the Proposition on
its face appears to be neutral. This was also the case in Yick Wo v.
Hofpkins. 79 In Tick Wo the Supreme Court held that state action
which is nondiscriminatory by its terms may constitute a de jure viola-
tion of equal protection if it is intentionally or purposefully applied in a
discriminatory manner. Even though Yick Wo dealt with discrimina-
tion on the basis of a suspect classification, the same analysis would
apply where the state impinges on a fundamental right.18 0 Pursuant to
Yick Wo, if a court were to deny the fundamental right to bail for one
accused of rape with two priors in one county, and grant own recogni-
zance release to an accused in an identical situation in another county,
an equal protection challenge could be reasonably anticipated. In or-
der to protect against this type of challenge a written statement of rea-
sons should be required even if an accused is released on his or her own
recognizance after a bail hearing. Under no circumstances should an
own recognizance release be granted where there is a substantial likeli-
hood of a threat to the community. Not only would own recognizance
179. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
180. See NOWAK, supra note 25, at 524-525.
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release, when there is a showing of dangerous propensity, defeat the
legitimate purpose of preventive detention, such release could also re-
sult in a possible ruling by the United States Supreme Court that Prop-
osition 4 on its face and in its application denies equal protection of the
law. Failure to consider alternatives to preventive detention, further
increases the likelihood that Proposition 4 will be found
unconstitutional.
E. Less Restrictive Means
As noted earlier, when state action impinges on the exercise of a fun-
damental right, or denies equal protection of the law to a suspect class
courts will apply strict judicial scrutiny.18' Strict scrutiny requires the
state to prove the action is in furtherance of a compelling state interest
and there are no less restrictive alternatives available to achieve the
purpose.182 .The theory has been proposed that protecting society from
violent individuals is a compelling state interest.' 83 Preventive deten-
tion presupposes that the way to protect society is to detain those ac-
cused of a violent crime prior to trial.184 Presuming there is a
fundamental right to pretrial bail, the burden is still on the state to
prove there are no means less restrictive than denial of an accused's
pretrial liberty, available to protect the community from a dangerous
individual. Recognition of the need to consider alternatives is included
in the District of Columbia scheme of preventive detention. The Dis-
trict of Columbia scheme requires the written statement to include a
showing that no condition or combination of conditions of release
could protect jurors, witnesses, or the community at large.'8 5 Proposi-
tion 4 does not provide for the same considerations. Subsection (b) of
Proposition 4 only requires a finding of a substantial likelihood of dan-
ger. No further showing is necessary to justify a denial of pretrial lib-
erty. The failure of Proposition 4 to require consideration of less
restrictive alternatives than preventive detention ignores the fundamen-
tal nature of pretrial liberty. Consideration of alternatives to detention
may allow courts to protect the community without breaching the trust
our forefathers reposed in them to protect our basic liberties. For ex-
ample, the District of Columbia scheme proposes certain conditions of
bail that could be imposed. Section 23-1321 of the District of Colum-
bia statute requires a court to consider the following alternatives:
181. See supra note 64.
182. Id.
183. See supra notts 107 & 108 and accompanying text.
184. See generally supra note 2.
185. D. C. CODE ENCYCL. 23-1322(b)(3).
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"(1) Place the accused in the custody of a designated person or organi-
zation agreeing to supervise him. (2) Place restrictions on the travel,
association or place of abode during the period of release. . . . (5) Im-
pose any other condition, including a condition requiring that the per-
son return to custody after specified hours of release for employment or
other limited purposes." At the very least it is strongly recommended
California courts consider the foregoing conditions of release before
denying bail. By requiring conditions of release, courts could ade-
quately protect the safety of the community, while still giving deference
to the fundamental nature of pretrial liberty.
Assembly Bill 2685,186 recently introduced in the California assem-
bly, would grant counties money to construct facilities which will pro-
vide protection for witnesses and jurors during a trial. Proposition 4
allows the court to deny bail where there is only a substantial likeli-
hood an accused will pose a threat to victims or witnesses. Whatever
amount of proof substantial likelihood does in fact constitute, the fun-
damental nature of pretrial liberty requires that denial of bail be bal-
anced against the ability of the police and state agencies to provide
protection. 187 An opportunity to prepare an adequate defense through
release on pretrial bail may outweigh the slight inconvenience police
protection would pose for victims and witnesses. 88 In observance of
the recognition by the Supreme Court that there is a presumed right to
pretrial bail,18 9 and the consistent holding that bail is basic to our sys-
tem of law,190 absent clear and convincing evidence an accused will
pose a threat to witnesses or victims while on bail, courts should con-
sider the conditions of release proposed by the District of Columbia
scheme and the protection provided by Assembly Bill 2685. Considera-
tion of the foregoing alternatives would support a denial of pretrial bail
subjected to strict scrutiny by demonstrating that no terms of release
would protect the community. Accordingly, in order to protect a denial
186. Cal. Stats. 1982, c. 1097, §2, at - (amending CAL. PEN. CODE §14101).
137. See Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 528-29 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The constitutionality
of pretrial preventive detention can be measured only by balancing the liberty interests of the
pretrial detainee against the need of the state to protect the safety of the community.
138. See Cobb v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 958 (1981). The court stated that the "Sixth Amend-
ment's speedy trial clause, which was derived from most ancient guarantees of fundamental rights,
prevents lengthy periods of detention that unnecessarily interfere with those liberty interests en-
joyed by the accused." .d. This case would support the theory that the eighth amendment bail
clause evidences a constitutional intent to assure a fair trial. See Note, supra note 3, at 357.
"Pretrial liberty permits defendant to prepare an adequate defense." See Hruska, supra note 3, at
184. Preparation of an adequate defense can be inhibited purely as a result of the incarceration.
It has been argued that the pretrial liberty improves the accused's chances of receiving a fair trial
by removing the psychological pressure of incarceration which manifests itself in uncooperative
courtroom behavior. See FREED, supra note 4, at 46.
189. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
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of bail against reversal under strict scrutiny, the court denying bail
should include a written statement recognizing that conditions of re-
lease were considered and a brief statement why the conditions were
deemed unsatisfactory. This consideration of alternatives to preventive
detention could insure that denial of bail in the face of a real threat to
the community could survive strict judicial scrutiny.
Serious questions concerning the constitutionality of Proposition 4
have been raised in this comment. As a result, consideration must be
given to the possibility that Proposition 4 could be ruled unconstitu-
tional, and preventive detention placed in jeopardy.
PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND PROPOSITION 8
A. Possible Developments
Proposition 4 stands on precarious constitutional ground. The possi-
bility that it may be declared unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court must be considered. In the event of such a decision, the
Public Safety Bill provision of Proposition 8,191 which also received an
affirmative vote in the June 1982 election, would become law.' 92 The
bail provision of Proposition 8 makes public safety the primary consid-
eration when setting, reducing, or denying bail. Consideration of pub-
lic safety when determining the amount of bail would violate the
Supreme Court's holding that bail set in an amount higher than that
required to insure attendance at trial would be excessive. 193 Therefore,
if the public's safety was considered when setting bail for an individual
determined to pose a danger to the community, bail set at an amount
191. The Public Safety Bail Clause of Proposition 8 reads,
(e) Public Safety Bail
A person may be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for capital crimes when
the facts are evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail may not be required. In
setting, reducing, or denying bail, the judge or magistrate shall take into consideration
the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal
record of the defendant and the probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing
of the case. Public safety shall be the primary consideration.
A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's discretion,
subject to the same factors considered in setting bail. However, no person charged with
the commission of any serious felony shall be released on his or her own recognizance.
Before any person arrested for a serious felony may be released on bail, a hearing may
be held before the magistrate or judge, and the prosecuting attorney shall be given notice
and reasonable opportunity to be heard on the matter.
When a judge or magistrate grants or denies bail or release on a person's own recogni-
zance, the reasons for that decision shall be stated in the record and included in the
court's minutes.
192. See CAL. CONsT. art. II, §10(b). Due to the fact Prop. 4 received a larger affirmative vote
it is law. If Prop. 4 is declared unconstitutional, the bail section of Prop. 8 goes into effect.
193. Bail may only be set in an amount designed to assure defendant's appearance at trial.
Bail may not be set in an amount designed to prevent release and protect the community. See
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
Paciic Law Journal / Vol. 14
designed to prevent release would be considered excessive. 194 Both
Proposition 4 and the eighth amendment, held by certain courts to be
applicable to the states, prohibit excessive bail. In order to overcome
this problem, legislation is needed to expressly limit consideration of
public safety to the decision whether to grant or deny bail. Otherwise,
bail set in an amount designed to protect the public by making it im-
possible for the accused to secure a money bond would violate estab-
lished case law and the excessive bail clause.
In addition to the problem of excessiveness, consideration of public
safety when setting the amount of bail also presents an equal protection
problem. In the case of In Re Antazo 191 the California Supreme Court
held that denial of bail on the basis of indigency constituted invidious
discrimination on the basis of wealth in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. The problem resulted from
the fact that wealthy individuals could attain pretrial liberty by secur-
ing a money bond. Indigents accused of the same crime would be de-
nied pretrial liberty purely on the basis of poverty. Antazo made
poverty a suspect classification so that the state had to show a compel-
ling interest for depriving the pretrial liberty of indigents while al-
lowing wealthy defendants to make bail.' 96 To remedy this problem
legislation was passed allowing indigents who could not afford a money
bond release on their own recognizance. 97 This resolved the equal pro-
tection problem. Consideration of public -safety when setting the
amount of bail recreates the problem which existed before Antazo.
Proposition 8 precludes own recognizance release when there is a find-
ing of dangerous propensity. Therefore, if a defendant were considered
to pose a threat to the community, and bail was set in a high amount to
prevent release, a wealthy defendant may still be able to secure a
money bond while an indigent would be denied pretrial freedom.
Since Proposition 8 prevents own recognizance release when there is a
showing of dangerous propensity, the amount of money one had would
again determine the likelihood of pretrial release. In light of Antazo a
strong argument exists that consideration of public safety in setting the
amount of bail, when no right to own recognizance release exists,
would violate equal protection. By way of contrast, it should be noted
that the District of Columbia scheme avoids these problems by ex-
pressly providing, "no financial conditions may be imposed to assure
the safety of any other person or the community."'1 98 It is strongly rec-
194. Id.
195. 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970).
196. Id; see Comment, supra note 6, at 848-49.
197. CAL. PENAL CODE §§1318, 1318.1.
198. D. C. CODE ENCYCL 23-1321(a)(5).
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ommended that in the event the bail provision of Proposition 8 be-
comes law, legislation should be passed limiting consideration of public
safety to the decision whether to grant or deny bail.
Another easily identifiable problem with Proposition 8 is the use of
language referring to detention for a serious felony. The theory has
been proposed that there is a compelling interest in protecting society
from dangerous individuals. Where a serious nonviolent felony has
been charged, a different situation is presented.
In Sellers v. United States, 99 the Supreme Court drew a distinction
between crimes of a serious nature and those involving physical vio-
lence. Pending appeal after conviction, the Supreme Court held that
bail could never be denied in the case of a nonviolent serious felony
when there was a substantial question to be resolved. In light of Sellers
the charges of a serious felony not involving physical violence should
never be a factor in the decision to deny bail or own recognizance re-
lease. The use of this language in Proposition 8 requires legislation
limiting preventive detention to situations where an accused poses a
threat of violence to the community. Otherwise, Justice Douglas' fear
expressed in Carbo that preventive detention could be used to discrimi-
nate against those accused of serious political crimes or merely held in
contempt by society could be realized.
CONCLUSION
The theory has been proposed that there exists in our concept of or-
dered liberty a fundamental right to pretrial freedom. 20 0 More impor-
tantly though, pretrial liberty results from the popular belief of the
American people that an accused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty. In large part the legitimacy of our criminal justice system rests
on this assumption. Now that the political climate is changing and pre-
trial liberty is being threatened by the states, it is time for the Supreme
Court to give substance to its implication that the eighth amendment
has been incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 20 1 An express holding that pretrial bail is a fundamental
right would not totally forbid preventive detention. States would
merely be required to enact statutory schemes similar to the one pres-
ently operating in the District of Columbia. For this reason, it is
strongly recommended that the California Legislature pass a preven-
tive detention scheme patterned after the District of Columbia scheme
199. Sellers v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 36, 38 (Black, Circuit Justice 1968).
200. See supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
201. For concurring opinions see generally Tribe, supra note 31, and Note, supra note 3.
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to serve as an enabling statute for Proposition 4. Legislative action in
this area could save Proposition 4 from being declared
unconstitutional.
Proposition 4 reflects a consensus that the community has a right to
be protected from dangerous individuals awaiting trial. Conservator-
ship proceedings also support this position.2"2 Absent adequate stan-
dards for predicting dangerous propensity, judges will be forced to
make a determination based on the nature of the crime charged. This
type of detention would constitute punishment for an offense alleged
before a showing of guilt.203 An accused would be forced to shoulder a
sentence purely on the basis of an accusation. 20 Not only is this consti-
tutionally suspect, but in a practical sense it impedes the ability of the
accused to prepare an adequate defense or receive a fair trial.20 5
The theory has not been proposed that an absolute right to pretrial
liberty exists; merely that the right should not be deprived without a
compelling state interest and proof that there are no less restrictive al-
ternatives available. It is strongly recommended that the legislature to
adopt a statutory scheme for preventive detention modeled after the
one which exists in the District of Columbia. As shown by the forego-
ing analysis the District of Columbia scheme is effective in safeguard-
ing basic liberties. In the absence of legislative action it will be
incumbent upon the trial judge to afford greater due process protection
than that which is provided for in Propogition 4. A written statement
which includes reasons for rejecting proposed conditions of release
would protect against reversal on appeal.
The United States Constitution was designed to protect our basic lib-
erties against the popular will of the people. Safety in the community
is an important concern which must be balanced against the right to
pretrial liberty. If Proposition 4 achieves this balance through the en-
actment of legislation, a scheme of preventive detention can exist which
respects the fundamental nature of pretrial liberty.
David Mark Parker
202. See CAL. PROB. CODE §2350.
203. See .supra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
204. Id.
205. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
